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Psychological and neuroscience approaches have promoted much progress in elucidating the cog-
nitive and neural mechanisms that underlie phenomenal visual awareness during the last decades. 
in this article, we provide an overview of the latest research investigating important phenomena in 
conscious and unconscious vision. We identify general principles to characterize conscious and un-
conscious visual perception, which may serve as important building blocks for a unified model to 
explain the plethora of findings. We argue that in particular the integration of principles from both 
conscious and unconscious vision is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing 
adequate theoretical models. Based on the principles identified in our review, we outline essential 
components of a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception. We propose that 
awareness refers to consolidated visual representations, which are accessible to the entire brain and 
therefore globally available. however, visual awareness not only depends on consolidation within 
the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory gating process, which is mediated 
by higher-level cognitive control mechanisms. We further propose that amplification of visual rep-
resentations by attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious perception, 
but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain unconscious. conscious and unconscious process-
ing modes are highly interdependent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that 
exactly this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual percep-
tion valuable. computational modeling jointly with focused experimental research could lead to a 
better understanding of the plethora of empirical phenomena in consciousness research.  
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Plethora of Phenomena                    
and Paradigms in exPerimental 
consciousness research
Elucidating human consciousness remains one of the greatest and most 
exciting scientific challenges in the 21st century. Until the 19th century, 
due to the privacy of consciousness phenomena, consciousness has 
been assumed to be inaccessible to empirical research and remained 
largely the domain of philosophy. In particular, the scientific expla-
nation of phenomenal awareness (or phenomenal consciousness after 
Block, 1995), that is, the experiential qualities of sensations, has been 
considered as the “hard problem” of consciousness research (Chalmers, 
1995;  Nagel,  1974).  It  has  been  questioned  whether  phenomenal 
awareness, which is essentially defined by subjective experience, can be 
studied in an objective empirical manner.
Advances in experimental psychology in the 19th and 20th century 
and in the cognitive neurosciences at the end of the 20th century have 
rendered  phenomenal  consciousness  accessible  to  empirical  inves-
tigations. Since the mid-nineties of the 20th century, consciousness 
research has become a recognized area within psychology and the 
neurosciences,  despite  all  epistemological  problems.  In  particular, 
rigorous psychophysical work on visual masking (Bachmann, 1994; 
Breitmeyer & Ganz, 1976; Bridgeman, 1971) and on subliminal vi-
suomotor priming as well as neurobiological studies on the neural 
correlates of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1990; Singer, 1999) have 
convincingly  demonstrated  that  an  empirically  informed  approach 
to consciousness is possible. These advances have been made pos-
sible by focusing research on specific aspects of consciousness, such 
as  the  dissociation  between  conscious  and  unconscious  percep-
tion,  altered  states  of  awareness,  and  amnesia.  Psychological  and 
neuroscience  approaches  in  combination  promote  further  progress 
in  elucidating  the  cognitive  and  neural  mechanisms  that  underlie 
phenomenal  awareness  and  its  functions  in  information  process-
ing.
Research in the domain of visual perception has been particularly 
successful because the presentation of visual stimuli can be control-
led precisely with current technology. Therefore, visual perception is 
ideally suited for investigating the dynamics of the processes ranging 
from the effects of unconscious stimuli to the generation of conscious 
perception. Within this field, there are several lines of research. One 
line focuses on the neuro-cognitive mechanisms underlying the effects 
of  unconscious  visual  stimuli  (subliminal  perception).  Within  this 
area, the focus is on the conditions for unconsciously perceived stimuli 
to influence (prime), that is, facilitate or inhibit, information process-
ing  and  motor  actions.  Theories  of  conscious  vision  are  informed 
indirectly by the limitations and potentials of unconscious vision. As 
various methods of rendering stimuli invisible may exert their sup-
pressive effects at different levels of visual processing, the faculties of 
unconscious processing may critically depend on the precise way of 
eliminating conscious awareness. Research in this field helps to eluci-
date the chain of processes giving rise to consciousness by comparing 
the faculties of visual processing across different unconscious states 
and by identifying the specific faculties that can only by achieved in 
a conscious state. Those types of processes that can only be performed 
in a conscious state are top candidates for understanding the functions 
of consciousness.
In this domain, a variety of experimental paradigms has been de-
veloped for studying the effects of unconscious primes on the process-
ing of subsequent visible target stimuli. Prime stimuli can be rendered 
invisible (subliminal) by masking stimuli which precede or follow the 
prime (for methods assessing prime visibility, see Khalid, König, & 
Ansorge, 2011; Schmidt, 2007). This procedure is called masked prim-
ing.
Here, a first observation is the remarkably rich range of processing 
faculties that can operate without conscious vision. Different forms 
of priming can be distinguished by the relation between prime and 
target realized in the experiment. In response priming (Neumann & 
Klotz, 1994), prime and target indicate either the same (e.g., right-
hand  response)  or  a  different  motor  response.  A  second  finding 
demonstrating  the  power  of  unconscious  processing  concerns  the 
flexibility of priming. Stimuli are arbitrarily associated with the mo-
tor response and do not show any other meaningful relation (for an 
overview, see Schmidt, Haberkamp, & Schmidt, 2011). For instance, 
geometrical objects are used as primes and targets, which are assigned 
to alternative responses. Thereby, prime-target pairings may be con-
gruent or incongruent in terms of their assigned response alternatives. 
Participants have typically to decide whether the target stimulus re-
quires a right-hand or a left-hand response. Response priming, that is, 
faster responses to targets when the prime indicates the same rather 
than a different response, arises from automatic visuomotor response 
preparation triggered by the unconsciously perceived masked prime 
(Dehaene, Naccache, et al., 1998; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Mattler, 
2003; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Schmidt, 2002; Verleger, Jaśkowski, 
Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, 
Schmidt,  &  Schwarzbach,  2003).  Extending  the  response  priming 
paradigm it has been demonstrated that subliminal stimuli can also 
modulate exogenous shifts of spatial attention (Ansorge, Heumann, & 
Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003), endogenous shifts of mo-
dality-specific attention (Mattler, 2003, 2005) as well as task-specific 
control operations (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006). Much as with motor 
priming, attentional effects can be triggered by primes that are just 
voluntarily and flexibly coupled to the task at hand, for example, to 
attend to red and ignore green figures (see Ansorge, Horstmann, & 
Scharlau, 2011).
In semantic priming (Neely, 1991), primes and targets are mean-
ingfully related words (or pictures) in one condition (e.g., table-chair) 
and unrelated words (or pictures) in the other condition (e.g., car-hen). 
In contrast to the response priming paradigm, primes in the congru-
ent and incongruent conditions always afford the same response in 
the target task thereby ruling out any response congruency effects. 
Nevertheless, responses to targets that have been preceded by a seman-
tically related prime are performed more quickly than responses to 
targets paired with unrelated primes (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 
2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). These masked AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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semantic priming effects reflect unconscious access to the meaning of 
the prime which automatically pre-activates the semantic represen-
tation of the target. In addition to these pure forms of response and 
semantic priming paradigms, mixed paradigms are possible in which 
primes and targets differ with regard to both semantic relatedness and 
response congruency (e.g., Damian, 2001).
Findings  from  the  different  masked  priming  paradigms  have 
established  subliminal  priming  effects  as  a  reliable  and  valid  in-
dex of unconscious stimulus processing. However, the issue is still 
unresolved  whether  the  same  functional  and  neural  mechanisms 
underlie  the  different  forms  of  subliminal  priming.  Hence,  al-
though the existence of unconscious stimulus processing has been 
demonstrated beyond doubt in several studies, the specific mecha-
nisms of these different forms of unconscious perception have still 
to be determined (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 
2006). 
A complementary line of consciousness research focuses on the 
functional and neural mechanisms underlying the generation of con-
scious percepts. This research aims at elucidating the interface between 
conscious and unconscious perception by employing a variety of ex-
perimental paradigms. For instance, the neural correlates of perceptual 
phenomena have been studied with the help of multistable stimulus 
configurations that give rise to alternative interpretations. Examples 
are unstable visual percepts during binocular rivalry or in ambiguous fi-
gures (Engel, Fries, König, Brecht, & Singer, 1999; Haynes, Deichmann, 
& Rees, 2005; Leopold & Logothetis, 1996; Mendola, Dale, Fischl, Liu, 
&  Tootell,  1999).  Furthermore,  experimentally  perturbing  percepts 
has been used as a technique for inferring the conditions needed to 
generate a complete conscious percept (e.g., Mattler & Fendrich, 2010). 
Most  paradigms  are  designed  to  investigate  experimental  factors 
which reduce conscious stimulus identification either due to masking, 
interfering stimuli, or attentional distraction. While visual masking 
presumably prevents the consolidation of the percept within the visual 
system (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Haynes, Driver, & Rees, 2005), the 
influence of a central top-down gating mechanism is postulated as the 
relevant factor for experimentally distractor-induced blindness. Such 
blindness has been exemplified in detecting coherent motion when 
preceded by to-be-ignored distractor motion (Niedeggen, Hesselmann, 
Sahraie,  Milders,  &  Blakemore,  2004).  Finally,  reduced  attentional 
resources are assumed to play a major role for the emergence of con-
sciousness as indicated by the attentional blink phenomenon (Shapiro, 
Arnell, & Raymond, 1997; Verleger et al., 2009). To elicit the attentional 
blink, two targets are embedded in a series of rapidly displayed visual 
stimuli. The second target may not be consciously reportable if the first 
target is actively processed and the temporal interval between both 
targets ranges between 200-500 ms. Is this due to the fact that attention 
is a necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for consciousness but 
blocked by the first target so that is momentarily not available for the 
second target in the sequence?
One can see from these experimental paradigms that they have 
the potential to provide insight into the mechanisms at a functional 
level, which contribute to the selection and integration of the visual 
information constituting the conscious percept. At a neural level, activ-
ity in brain areas has been identified which correlates with conscious 
percepts.
In order to successfully elucidate the mechanisms of conscious and 
unconscious visual perception both at a functional behavioral and at a 
neural level, the processes behind the phenomena must be identified 
by a broad range of methods. Behavioral measures provide an insight 
in the functional properties of the neuro-cognitive system. As they 
are the output of the entire processing chain, they cannot be used for 
on-line monitoring of cognitive processing. However, given the appro-
priate experimental manipulations, a particular behavioral measure 
may tap into specific parts of the neuro-cognitive system (for an exam-
ple, see Breitmeyer, Koc, Ziegler, & Öğmen, 2008).
Neurophysiological measures, in contrast, convey information on 
the functional neuroanatomical architecture of the cognitive system 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) and on the tempo-
ral  and  spatial  time  course  of  processing  (event-related  potentials, 
ERPs;  magnetoencephalography,  MEG).  Important  complementary 
methods to these are studies with brain-damaged patients and with 
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS).  Unlike  neurophysiologi-
cal measures, which only provide correlational evidence, TMS and 
patients studies allow to determine whether activity in some specific 
brain area is necessarily involved in a given cognitive process, such 
as those giving rise to consciousness. If a behavioral effect disappears 
because of damage to a particular brain area or its transient modu-
lation by TMS, this finding suggests that this area necessarily plays a 
functional role for producing this effect and is part of the underlying 
processes.
This brief overview of research in the past decades shows that pre-
vious studies pragmatically investigated certain aspects of conscious-
ness  phenomena  by  heterogeneous  experimental  paradigms.  The 
use of various experimental approaches and the focus on different 
phenomena renders it difficult to bridge the gaps between the differ-
ent research areas and to develop a unified theory of conscious and 
unconscious visual perception. 
identifying general PrinciPles  
underlying conscious and  
unconscious visual PercePtion
The diversity of consciousness research renders it difficult to promote 
the integration of separate lines of research on consciousness and visual 
awareness. Nevertheless, the findings of the seemingly heterogeneous 
studies in consciousness research provide a rich source of evidence 
to identify general principles that play a central role in conscious and 
unconscious visual perception. Some of them might be common to 
several phenomena or experimental paradigms; others might apply 
to one area only. In this section, we will describe general principles, 
by addressing five major questions which may help to systematize the 
plethora of findings in research on visual awareness. Due to the vast 
extent of the field, this review necessarily has to focus on a selection of 
phenomena and of experimental paradigms. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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Which cognitive systems          
and/or brain regions are relevant 
for generating conscious visual 
percepts?
According to one currently popular view, consciousness in general 
and visual awareness in particular depends on coordinated process-
ing in several cognitive systems and correspondingly involves a large 
network of brain areas (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Haynes, Driver, 
& Rees, 2005). However, although a coherent, unitary percept is one 
of the key features of conscious experience at a subjective level, at a 
neural level this unitary percept may actually arise from distributed 
processing in lower-and higher-order visual areas of the occipito-tem-
poral cortex (Lamme, 2003) as well as in attentional areas outside 
visual cortex (Hamker, 2007). Therefore, consciousness is unlikely to 
be the simple result of processing in a single “consciousness” module 
(Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992): Besides the various components of 
the  visual  system  (primary,  secondary,  and  visual  association  cor-
tex), prefrontal and temporo-parietal brain areas involved in atten-
tion and cognitive control (Posner & Driver, 1992) are crucial in the 
generation of visual awareness that can be expressed in verbal reports 
(Hulme,  Friston,  &  Zeki,  2009;  Lamme,  2003).  The  modularity  of 
visual information processing raises the question regarding the role 
of the different modules in the generation of conscious experience. 
According to one view, there are several states of micro-conscious-
ness and the experience of the unity of consciousness is an illusion 
(Zeki, 2003).
Despite  the  distributed  nature  of  processing  subserving  visual 
awareness,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  some  brain  areas  or 
cognitive systems are more important than others. Damage to pri-
mary visual cortex in the occipital lobe results in cortical blindness 
although visual abilities of these patients can be improved by per-
ceptual  learning  induced  by  repeated  stimulation  of  the  impaired 
visual field (Trevethan, Urquhart, Ward, Gentleman, & Sahraie, 2012): 
Besides  visual  areas,  brain  regions  supporting  attention  appear  to 
play a crucial role in visual awareness. In particular, right temporo-
parietal areas that are damaged in patients with neglect syndrome 
are crucial in generating a conscious visual percept, presumably by 
guiding attention in space (Karnath, Ferber, & Himmelbach, 2001; 
Karnath,  Fruhmann-Berger,  Kuker,  &  Rorden,  2004).  Based  upon 
this and similar findings, it has been suggested that visual processing 
in the right hemisphere is dominating the conscious percept. Using 
two streams with rapid serial visual presentation in each hemifield, 
the  right  hemisphere  has  been  shown  to  be  superior  in  conscious 
visual  perception  of  the  second  of  two  targets  embedded  in  these 
streams  (Śmigasiewicz  et  al.,  2010;  Verleger  et  al.,  2009).  This 
right-hemisphere  (RH)/  left-visual-field  (LVF)  advantage  proved 
robust    across  cultures  (Śmigasiewicz  et  al.,  2010)  and  against 
interference  by  repetitive  TMS  (Verleger  et  al.,  2010).  It  is  sug-
gested that the RH/LVF advantage in visual perception reflects an 
attentional  bias  under  high  attentional  load,  presumably  due  to 
the  superiority  of  the  RH  attentional  system  for  guiding  attention 
in space.
Which mechanisms are responsible 
for the selection and integration of 
visual information that contributes 
to the conscious visual percept?
It is well documented that only a fraction of the physical information 
that reaches the retina contributes to the conscious visual percept. 
Stimuli that would be visible if presented in isolation are invisible 
when subsequently masked by a spatially overlapping visual pattern 
or by a surrounding metacontrast stimulus (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 
2006). Although there are several competing models on visual mask-
ing, they all converge on the assumption that awareness requires some 
consolidation of information within the visual system depending on 
interactions within visual areas (Bachmann, 2007; Breitmeyer, 2007; 
Bridgeman, 2007; Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 
2007; Scharlau, Ansorge, & Breitmeyer, 2006). In addition, phenomena 
such as inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998; Rees, Russell, Frith, 
& Driver, 1999), change blindness (Rensink, O‘Regan, & Clark, 1997), 
and the attentional blink (Shapiro et al., 1997) show that attentional 
top-down amplification of the target representation contributes to a 
successful consolidation process leading to visual awareness (Kessler 
et al., 2005). The N2pc component of the ERP reflects the allocation 
of visual attention to potentially task-relevant stimuli. By analyzing 
the detailed time-course of N2pc, Verleger, Żurawska vel Grajewska, 
and Jaśkowski (2012) provide evidence for the oscillatory nature of the 
generating process, possibly reflecting recurrent loops of processing in 
visual cortex.
A neural instance of the global workspace theory assumes that 
stimuli require a sufficiently strong activation level to enter the global 
workspace, while stimuli with a slightly weaker activation level quickly 
decay (Dehaene et al., 2006). Dehaene and colleagues (2006) distin-
guish accessibility from access to account for conflicting neuroimaging 
data. A weak or interrupted stimulus activates only early visual areas. Its 
subliminal processing can be influenced by the subject’s attention using 
an attentional set which is already prepared prior to the task (Kiefer 
& Martens, 2010). A sufficiently strong stimulus is processed precon-
sciously but temporarily buffered in a non-conscious store because of 
a lack of top-down attentional amplification (Dehaene et al., 2006) as 
in attentional blink or inattentional blindness paradigms or because 
of a failure to encode the stimulus in working memory circuits as in 
the distractor-induced blindness paradigm. Once attentional resources 
are available and the central workspace is freed, a pre-conscious stimu-
lus might ultimately achieve conscious access which is manifested by 
intense activation spreading from visual areas to the fronto-parietal 
attentional network. Presumably, this information exchange between 
visual areas and the fronto-parietal attentional network is achieved 
by coordinated oscillatory activity in different frequency bands across 
multiple brain regions as suggested by electrophysiological recordings 
during the attentional blink (Janson & Kranczioch, 2011).
However, the neural structures that mediate the global workspace 
are less clear. While prefrontal cortex subserving attention and work-
ing memory functions is certainly a substantial part of the global work-
space, its understanding will also help to reveal the transition from AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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pre-conscious to conscious perception. Among others, the basal gan-
glia have been proposed to play an important role in working memory 
control (Brown, Schneider, & Lidsky, 1997; Middleton & Strick, 2000) 
as supported by recent computational models of basal ganglia function 
(O’Reilly & Frank, 2006; Vitay & Hamker, 2010).
Studies on distractor-induced blindness suggest that awareness not 
only depends on attentional amplification through global workspace 
circuits, but also on a post-sensory central gating mechanism presum-
ably exerted by prefrontal circuits that permits or prevents stimuli to 
enter conscious awareness (Niedeggen et al., 2004). In the paradigm 
of distractor-induced blindness (Sahraie, Milders, & Niedeggen, 2001), 
conscious access to simple visual features (i.e., motion or orientation) 
is impaired during rapid serial visual presentation when the same fea-
ture had to be ignored as a distractor previously. Psychophysical and 
electrophysiological experiments on this effect indicated that distrac-
tor stimuli which share visual features with an upcoming target will 
activate an inhibitory mechanism. The strength of the inhibition is pri-
marily defined by the number of distractors presented (Hesselmann, 
Niedeggen, Sahraie, & Milders, 2006). ERP studies indicated that the 
inhibition tags a central process and does not directly affect sensory 
processing (Niedeggen et al., 2004) because ERP correlates of the sen-
sory processing of visual motion (Niedeggen, Sahraie, Hesselmann, 
Milders, & Blakemore, 2002), or orientation changes did not differ 
between detected and missed events. These results are inconsistent 
with suggestions that the conscious representation of visual stimuli is 
closely related to activity in the occipital cortex (Pins & Ffytche, 2003). 
Together with similar findings reported in studies on the attentional 
blink (Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Luck, Vogel, & Shapiro, 
1996), the data on distractor-induced blindness suggest that activation 
of visual cortex is necessary, but not sufficient, to generate visual aware-
ness. Although the precise nature of the central gating mechanisms has 
to be elucidated further, these results also indicate that encoding of 
stimuli into working memory circuits, which is mediated by higher-
level control mechanisms (Zhang, Zhou, & Martens, 2009) is neces-
sary to give rise to visual awareness in addition to sensory activation. 
Presumably, currently active or inhibited attentional task sets are the 
basis  of  this  gating  mechanism  and  determine,  which  information 
is  encoded  into  working  memory  (Michael,  Kiefer,  &  Niedeggen, 
2012).
What is the role of top-down 
influences for conscious             
and unconscious perception?
As noted above, top-down attention leads to amplification of the sensory 
representation of a target stimulus (Hamker, 2005, 2007), an important 
prerequisite for visual awareness (Dehaene et al., 2006). Attentional 
amplification is achieved by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex 
(Haynes, et al., 2007) that modulate activity of single neurons in sen-
sory brain areas in the absence of any sensory stimulation (Tomita, 
Ohbayashi, Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Miyashita, 1999) and significantly 
increase baseline activity in the corresponding target region (Reynolds, 
Chelazzi, & Desimone, 1999). Electrophysiological evidence in behav-
ing animals suggests that such attentional sensitization is instantiated 
and sustained through selective neuronal synchronization of rhythmic 
activity at fast and slow temporal scales within and between neuronal 
groups (Womelsdorf & Fries, 2007).
Neuroimaging studies in human participants showed that perceiv-
ing a cue that indicates what will be the relevant dimension of the tar-
get is associated first with increased activity in prefrontal areas (Bode 
& Haynes, 2008; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Hopfinger, 
Woldorff, Fletcher, & Mangun, 2001). Second, in posterior brain ar-
eas, the target region of attentional control, attention to some specific 
stimulus dimension increases the level of baseline activity in the cor-
responding sensory region, even when visual stimulation is kept con-
stant (Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; Serences, Saproo, Scolari, Ho, 
& Muftuler, 2009; Song, Rowland, McPeek, & Wade, 2011).
Similar to phenomena in conscious perception, unconscious proc-
esses are susceptible to attentional control. Unconscious priming has 
been shown to depend on attentional top-down amplification. Priming 
was only obtained when the masked prime was presented within the 
time window of attention (Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Naccache, Blandin, 
& Dehaene, 2002). Furthermore, top-down control processes can con-
strain processing of unconsciously perceived stimuli if they misguide 
overt behavior (Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003; Wolbers et al., 
2006). Presumably, top-down control is reactively engaged in response 
to previous consciously perceived errors in order to suppress interfer-
ing subliminal information. The influence of attention on unconscious 
visual  processing  is  even  more  specific  because  masked  response 
priming has been shown to depend on action intentions and task 
sets: Unconsciously perceived masked primes trigger responses only 
if they are congruent with the current intentions of a person (Ansorge 
et al., 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005) and represent possible re-
lease conditions for prepared actions (Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kiesel, 
Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007; Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 
2009;  Kunde,  Kiesel,  &  Hoffmann,  2003).  Furthermore,  Ng, Chan, 
and Schlaghecken (2012) showed that unconscious visuo-motor pro-
cesses are differentially influenced by cognitive control settings induced 
by specific emotional states (subclinical depression vs. anxiety). Using 
a novel procedure for masked priming of words and of geometrical 
shapes, attentional task sets were shown to influence unconscious se-
mantic and visuo-motor processes selectively (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; 
Martens & Kiefer, 2009). These results demonstrate that preemptive 
top-down control of unconscious processes coordinates the percep-
tual  and  semantic  processing  streams:  An  attentional  sensitization 
mechanism  enhances  or  attenuates  the  responsiveness  of  semantic 
and visuo-motor processing pathways to incoming subliminal stimuli 
depending on the currently activated task set (Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & 
Martens, 2010), thereby differentially influencing subsequent sublimi-
nal semantic and visuo-motor priming. This attentional mechanism 
optimizes ongoing processing toward the pursuit of an intended goal 
and therefore ensures the adaptability of cognition even in the uncon-
scious domain (see also Kiefer, Adams, & Zovko, 2012).
In a continuation of this line of research, the capture of visuo-
spatial attention by unconscious stimuli likewise was shown to depend AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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on the match between these stimulus features and a fitting top-down 
search template directed towards the relevant visual features of the 
targets (Ansorge, Horstmann, & Worschech, 2010; Ansorge, Kiss, & 
Eimer, 2009; Held, Ansorge, & Müller, 2010). With respect to the allo-
cation of visuo-spatial attention, it was concluded that the feedforward 
phase of visual processing was entirely determined by top-down task 
sets (Ansorge, Horstmann, & Scharlau, 2010). Top-down effects on 
attentional capture by unconscious stimuli are discussed in detail by 
Ansorge, Horstmann, and Scharlau (2011) and by Reuss, Pohl, Kiesel, 
and Kunde (2011).
The influence of attention on unconscious processing also dem-
onstrates that attention and consciousness are distinct mental pheno-
mena (cf. Mack & Rock, 1998). Some researches even argue against a 
significant role of attention in determining the content of awareness 
(Van  Boxtel,  Tsuchiya,  &  Koch,  2010).  However,  neither  attention 
nor consciousness are well defined. A unified model of conscious and 
unconscious visual perception must refer to unambiguously clear defi-
nitions of such terms preferably manifested by computational models 
(for a recent proposal, see Trapp, Schroll, & Hamker, 2012).
Are there common mechanisms 
of all types of unconscious visual 
processing (perceptual, motor,  
and cognitive)?
Subliminal priming studies show that unconscious visual stimuli can 
trigger processes at perceptual, motor, and semantic levels but also 
at levels of cognitive control. For instance, masked stimuli can elicit 
perceptual (Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003; Scharlau & Horstmann, 2006), 
visuo-motor  (Dehaene,  Naccache,  et  al.,  1998;  Neumann  &  Klotz, 
1994; Vorberg et al., 2003), semantic (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 
2002),  attentional  (Ansorge  et  al.,  2002;  Mattler,  2003,  2005),  and 
control-related effects (Mattler, 2003, 2005, 2006) on the processing 
of subsequently presented visible targets. Although involving distinct 
processing streams in the brain, these different subliminal priming 
effects seem to be governed by fairly similar mechanisms: By their 
dependence on attention, intention and task sets, all of these types 
of processes triggered by the unconscious primes are susceptible to 
top-down control. As already discussed in detail above, unconscious 
priming, both visuo-motor and semantic priming, has been shown 
to  require  attentional  top-down  amplification.  Subliminal  priming 
effects were only obtained when the primes were attended to (Kiefer 
& Brendel, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002) or when attentional resources 
were available (Martens & Kiefer, 2009). Furthermore, masked visuo-
motor priming and semantic priming have been shown to depend on 
action intentions (Ansorge et al., 2002; Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; 
Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kiesel et al., 2007, 2009; Kunde et al., 2003) 
and task sets (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Martens, Ansorge, & Kiefer 
2011; Martens & Kiefer, 2009).
Beyond  these  general  preconditions  for  priming  effects  of  un-
conscious stimuli, evidence has accumulated which suggests that at 
least part of these effects of masked stimuli result from a common 
mechanism of information integration. Vorberg et al. (2003) described 
this simple integration mechanism which accounts for the temporal 
dynamics  of  priming  effects  on  performance  measures  in  forced-
choice reaction time tasks. This model has been specified to account 
for visuo-motor priming effects on reaction times and error rates. 
However, when the dynamics of non-motor priming effects has been 
examined, findings suggest a comparable time course for priming of 
attention as well as of priming of cognitive control operations (Mattler, 
2003,  2005).  Therefore,  the  mechanism  of  information  integration 
might provide a general framework to account for subliminal priming 
effects that are dissociated from mechanisms which generate conscious 
percepts of the corresponding stimuli (Mattler, 2003, 2005; Schmidt & 
Vorberg, 2006).
How does conscious visual 
processing differ from  
unconscious visual processing? 
The  review  above  shows  that  conscious  and  unconscious  visual 
processing share a variety of principles: Priming experiments indicate 
that visual processing is comparable for conscious and unconscious 
viewing conditions within the first hundred milliseconds of stimu-
lus processing (Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000; Vorberg et al., 2003; Vorberg, 
Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004). In line with this, 
unconscious  visual  words  can  elicit  motor  activation  effects  based 
on a word’s long-term meaning (e.g., Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, 
& König, 2010), much as it has been shown with conscious words 
(Proctor & Vu, 2002). Furthermore, conscious and unconscious visual 
processing are similarly susceptible to attentional control and depend 
on attentional resources.
However, there are also important differences: Unlike conscious 
control,  top-down  control  of  unconscious  cognition  requires  task 
sets to be set up in advance of stimulus presentation (i.e., preemptive 
control) and cannot be initiated reactively in response to the sensory 
input (Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid, & Kunde, 2011; Ansorge & Horstmann, 
2007; Ansorge et al., 2009; Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In 
line with this assumption, unconsciously induced conflict does not 
seem to alter cognitive control settings in contrast to conscious stimuli 
(Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). Furthermore, only conflict elicited 
by conscious, but not by unconscious stimuli leads to an adjustment 
of  conflict  regulation  in  a  subsequent  trial  (Ansorge  et  al.,  2011; 
Greenwald,  Draine,  &  Abrams,  1996;  Kunde,  2003).  The  relation 
between consciousness and cognitive control is further discussed by 
Kunde, Reuss, and Kiesel (2012).
A further difference between conscious and unconscious visual 
processing concerns the stability of processes as a function of time: 
For  instance,  under  unconscious  conditions,  semantic  priming  ef-
fects decayed relatively fast (i.e., within about 200 ms) whereas under 
conscious conditions priming increased with time (Greenwald et al., 
1996;  Kiefer  &  Spitzer,  2000).  This  finding  suggests  that  processes 
triggered by unconscious visual stimuli fade quite fast as a function of 
time, presumably because unconscious visual representations are not 
consolidated and are therefore temporally less stable (see also Mattler, 
2005). In contrast, conscious visual representations are temporally very AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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stable, because they are highly consolidated within the visual systems 
and additionally benefit from active maintenance in working memory 
(Dehaene et al., 2006; Merikle & Daneman, 1998). This suggestion is 
in line with findings from intracranial recordings in humans demon-
strating increased neural activity in widespread higher-order visual 
areas for consciously perceived stimuli starting at about 150 ms that 
outlasted stimulus presentation (Fisch et al., 2009). Conscious and un-
conscious visual processing do not only differ in the temporal stability 
of visual representations, but also with regard to the speed at which 
different  visual  features  are  processed:  At  unconscious  levels  form 
processing proceeds faster than surface processing, whereas at con-
scious levels form processing proceeds slower than surface processing 
(see Breitmeyer & Tapia, 2011).
towards a unified model                          
of conscious and unconscious 
visual PercePtion
The general principles that we have identified above to characterize 
conscious  and  unconscious  visual  perception  may  serve  as  impor-
tant building blocks for a unified model to explain the plethora of 
findings in these domains. We strongly believe that in particular the 
integration  of  principles  from  both  conscious  and  unconscious  vi-
sion is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing 
adequate theoretical models. In the following part, based on a synthesis 
of these general principles, we outline essential elements, which any 
unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception should 
incorporate according to our view. Many elements and mechanisms 
that we describe below are already partially realized in existing theo-
ries of cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; Posner & Rothbart, 
1998),  consciousness  (Crick  &  Koch,  1990;  Dehaene  &  Naccache, 
2001;  Lamme,  2003),  attention  (Hamker,  2005;  Pessoa,  Kastner,  & 
Ungerleider, 2003; Zirnsak, Beuth, & Hamker, in press), and uncon-
scious  processing  (Ansorge  &  Neumann,  2005;  Kiefer  &  Martens, 
2010;  Kunde  et  al.,  2003;  Neumann,  1990). However, to achieve a 
breakthrough  we  strongly  believe  that  the  different  mechanisms, 
which served to explain heterogeneous phenomena of conscious and 
unconscious vision in the past, have to be integrated within one single 
model. This envisioned unified model should in particular elaborate 
on the nature of attentional control mechanisms that influence both 
conscious and unconscious visual perception, preferably at a formal 
computational level (for a recent proposal, see e.g., Trapp et al., 2012).
In line with many other models, we assume that visual awareness 
depends on consolidation of representations within the visual system. 
Consolidation of representations is achieved by feedforward and feed-
back processing (re-entrant processing) within lower-level and higher-
level visual areas. Successful consolidation of a visual representation is 
characterized by a sustained and stable neural activation pattern, which 
lasts for a few hundred milliseconds. In addition to physical stimulus 
strength (defined by duration, luminance, or contrast) and temporal 
distance to preceding or following stimuli (i.e., visual masks), con-
solidation benefits from top-down attention, which amplifies the visual 
representation of the target stimulus (Dehaene et al., 2006; Hamker, 
2005, 2007). We assume that stimulus strength, temporal distance to 
other (masking) stimuli (target-mask stimulus onset asynchrony), and 
attentional amplification influence consolidation in a compensatory 
manner (for the conjoint influence of attention and target-mask SOA, 
see Bruchmann, Hintze, & Mota, 2011): Target stimuli of sufficient 
strength presented at a large temporal distance to subsequent stimuli 
(i.e., in the absence of masking effects) can be efficiently consolidated 
even when they receive no or only little attentional amplification (Van 
Boxtel et al., 2010). In contrast, stimuli with only little physical strength 
(e.g., briefly presented) followed by other stimuli in close temporal 
succession (during visual masking) remain unconscious although they 
are attended to (Ansorge et al., 2009). Hence, in line with previous 
proposals, we assume that attention and visual awareness are related, 
but distinct phenomena (Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Koch & Tsuchiya, 
2007; Lamme, 2003): Attention refers to an amplification of stimulus 
representation  in  the  task-relevant  processing  pathways  through  a 
prefrontal top-down signal, which increases the probability that a neu-
ron or a population for neurons fires at a given activation level (Trapp 
et al., 2012). Attentional amplification is not uniformly distributed 
across both visual fields, but exhibits are bias towards the left visual 
field: Attentional amplification is more pronounced in the left visual 
field particularly under high attentional load, for instance for visual 
identification in rapid serial visual presentation or for complex visual 
search. This RH/LVF attentional bias is presumably due to the supe-
riority of right temporo-parietal areas for guiding attention in space 
when stimuli in both visual fields compete for attentional amplification 
in rapid succession.
According to our view, attention facilitates the visual consolidation 
process, but is neither necessary nor sufficient for visual awareness. 
Awareness  refers  to  consolidated  visual  representations,  which  are 
accessible to the entire brain and therefore globally available. Visual 
awareness  not  only  depends  on  attention-mediated  consolidation 
within the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory 
gating process (Niedeggen et al., 2004), which determines whether 
consolidated stimuli are encoded into working memory in accord-
ance with active task sets. Consolidated stimuli only reach awareness 
and are available for verbal report, when they are encoded in working 
memory circuits. Our suggestion of a post-sensory gating process into 
working memory circuits is derived from studies on distractor-induced 
blindness where the presentation of distractors led to deficits in visual 
awareness while activity in the sensory system remained unaffected.
We  therefore  propose  that  visual  awareness  depends  on  both 
consolidation within the visual system and subsequent post-sensory 
encoding into working memory. The latter is accomplished by a cen-
tral gating mechanism according to currently active task sets. If one of 
the processes fails, the visual stimulus remains unconscious because 
consolidation is assumed to be a prerequisite for working memory 
encoding.
As far as the involved brain areas are concerned, consciousness 
likely  comprises  modality-specific  association  cortices  to  represent AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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the content of consciousness and those areas that dynamically bind 
cortical activity into a single consciously perceived state. The binding 
mechanism must be an active process that dynamically links particular 
brain areas together. An outline of a theoretical concept is given by 
Trapp et al. (2012). Prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia are involved in 
cognitive control and working memory. However, they appear also to 
be the core structures determining the content of consciousness. In ad-
dition, the thalamus appears to implement the binding itself by rapidly 
switching transmission in cortical areas and thus allowing a dynamic 
reconfiguration of functional connectivity.
Even if a stimulus does not give rise to a conscious percept, it 
can  trigger  processes  in  various  brain  systems  and  thereby  influ-
ence  cognition  and  behavior  as  shown  by  subliminal  priming 
studies:  Unconscious  stimuli  elicit  processes  not  only  in  systems 
functionally  and  anatomically  closely  related  to  the  visual  system 
such as visuo-motor, semantic, and affective brain circuits, but also 
in higher-level systems devoted to attention and cognitive control: 
Unconscious  visual  stimuli  even  modulate  the  focus  of  attention 
and activate specific task sets demonstrating their far reaching influ-
ence on top-down control. Unconscious processing in the different 
higher- and lower level systems seems to be based on similar infor-
mation  integration  processes  as  shown  by  the  temporal  dynamics 
of subliminal priming.
Most notably, unconscious processing is not autonomous and in-
variantly triggered whenever a subliminal stimulus is presented, but 
crucially requires an appropriate configuration of the cognitive system 
by attention, task sets, and action intentions in advance of stimulus 
presentation. We assume that unconscious stimulus processing, similar 
to conscious processing, can be sensitized by attention. This attentional 
sensitization mechanism is thought to be driven by a prefrontal top-
down signal and enhances unconscious processing in task-relevant 
pathways (e.g., visuo-motor, semantic, affective, attentional, etc.) while 
it attenuates processing in task-irrelevant pathways. Hence, uncon-
sciously perceived stimuli can trigger only those processes that match 
currently active attentional task sets and action goals. In line with our 
suggestion, top-down attentional modulation of unconscious process-
ing is empirically well documented. The fact that attentional influ-
ences affect unconscious processing and are not restricted to conscious 
perception is another argument for our proposal that attention and 
consciousness cannot be equated (Lamme, 2003).
Given that unconscious and conscious visual processing is assumed 
to differ only with regard to visual consolidation and/or post-sensory 
gating into working memory, it immediately follows that both visual 
processing modes exhibit many similarities in their potential to trig-
ger processes in other cognitive systems and in their susceptibility to 
attentional control. 
However, as unconscious visual perception lacks visual consolida-
tion and/or encoding into working memory circuits, several functional 
differences emerge between unconscious and conscious visual process-
ing modes. First, conscious visual representations are temporally more 
stable  than  unconscious  representations  because  they  are  actively 
maintained in working memory circuits. Second, top-down control for 
conscious processing is certainly more flexible than for unconscious 
processing. Preemptive control can be exerted for both conscious and 
unconscious  stimulus  presentation,  whereas  only  consciously  per-
ceived stimuli are susceptible to reactive control in response to ongo-
ing or completed stimulus processing. Reactive control is presumably 
restricted to conscious visual processing because this control mode 
requires monitoring the consequences of stimulus processing in work-
ing memory. As unconscious stimuli do not leave traces in working 
memory circuits, top-down control of unconscious cognition must oc-
cur implicitly on the grounds of currently activated action goals or the 
outcome of overt behavior. As a consequence, intentional application 
of control and online modification is restricted to conscious vision. 
Thus, conscious stimulus processing allows for a greater adaptability 
and flexibility of top-down control than processing under unconscious 
viewing conditions.
conclusion
Based on a literature review of the plethora of empirical phenomena 
in  consciousness  research,  we  have  identified  important  principles 
underlying conscious and unconscious visual perception and outlined 
essential elements of a unified model. We propose that conscious visual 
perception depends on a consolidation process within the visual sys-
tem and a subsequent post-sensory gating process, which determines, 
whether a stimulus is encoded in prefrontal working memory circuits. 
Only  if  both  processes  are  successfully  completed,  the  stimulus  is 
consciously perceived and reportable; otherwise the stimulus remains 
unconscious. Attention facilitates the consolidation process by ampli-
fying the visual stimulus representation and therefore increases the 
likelihood for generating a conscious percept, but is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for visual awareness.
We further propose that amplification of visual representations by 
attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious 
perception, but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain uncon-
scious.  Hence,  processing  of  both  consciously  and  unconsciously 
perceived visual stimuli depends on top-down attention. Given the 
appropriate attentional state, set up in advance of stimulus presenta-
tion, which sensitizes the corresponding neural processing pathways, 
unconscious stimuli trigger processes in the visuo-motor, semantic, 
and affective systems and influence even cognitive control processes. 
Conscious and unconscious processing modes are highly interdepend-
ent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that exactly 
this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and uncon-
scious visual perception valuable.
Although much progress has been made to elucidate the neuro-
cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual percep-
tion, we want to highlight four issues, which represent important areas 
of future research: 
1. The nature of the proposed visual consolidation process, which 
is assumed to be an important factor for visual awareness, has to 
be further specified. Although re-entrant processing within visual 
areas might be important for consolidation, conclusive evidence is AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology revieW Article
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missing so far. Likewise, it has to be better elucidated at a functional 
and neural level how the prefrontal attentional top-down signal in-
fluences in interaction with temporo-parietal areas the consolida-
tion of visual representations. 
2. Although several lines of evidence suggest the importance of a 
putative prefrontal post-sensory gating mechanism for generating 
visual awareness, its precise function and neural substrate as well 
as its interaction with the visual consolidation process in occipito-
temporal areas remains to be determined. 
3. We are only at the beginning of understanding the interplay 
between conscious and unconscious visual processing modes: On 
the  one  hand,  attentional  sets  appear  to  influence  unconscious 
processing in congruency with higher-level action goals. On the 
other  hand,  unconsciously  perceived  stimuli  seem  to  modulate 
conscious percepts as well as cognitive control settings. It is highly 
desirable to better characterize the functional and neural mecha-
nisms underlying these mutual influences between conscious and 
unconscious domains. 
4. The future development of a unified computational model of 
conscious and unconscious visual perception is certainly essential 
to formally specify the mechanisms that we have outlined here 
and to derive novel predictions to be tested in future experiments. 
We strongly believe that an approach that integrates research on 
conscious and unconscious vision is particularly suited to explain 
the neuro-cognitive mechanisms giving rise to human conscious-
ness. Computational modeling jointly with focused experimental 
research could lead to a better understanding of the plethora of 
empirical phenomena in consciousness research, particularly by its 
potential to reveal underlying mechanisms for multiple observa-
tions and to formulate rigid testable predictions.
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